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An empirical investigation of age-related development of the 
ability to deceive was conducted from the perspective of Relational 
Frame Theory, which, unlike the traditional approach, Theory of Mind, 
has been used to analyze deception in terms of the complexity of 
the relational responding involved. A derived relational responding–
based protocol was used to compare the deception-taking skills of 
five different age groups. Results indicated that performances on the 
tasks improved as a function of age, supporting the current concept 
of deception as a learned relationally complex behavioral pattern. 
The findings are discussed in terms of their implications for the 
mainstream developmental literature on deception.
Deception is defined as the intentional deceit or misleading of a 
second party to influence that party’s behavior (Heyes, 1988). Arguably 
the most well researched approach to deception thus far is by researchers 
working under the rubric of Theory of Mind (ToM; e.g., Baron-Cohen, 
Tager-Flusberg, & Cohen, 2000). From this perspective, children’s 
ability to understand and predict social behavior becomes increasingly 
sophisticated as they develop increasingly complex representations of 
mental informational states in themselves and others. According to ToM, 
deception requires a relatively advanced theory or representation of mind, 
because it necessitates the ability to mentally represent false beliefs, a 
relatively advanced ToM ability, as well as being able to construct and 
impart such beliefs to others (e.g., see Yirmiya et al., 1996).
More recently, a number of theories have begun to approach ToM-
relevant skills, including deception in terms of relational complexity (e.g., 
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Andrews, Halford, Bunch, Bowden, & Jones, 2003; McHugh, Barnes-
Holmes, & Barnes-Holmes, 2004). One such approach is Relational 
Frame Theory (RFT; Hayes, Barnes-Holmes & Roche, 2001), which 
conceptualizes language and higher cognition as derived or generalized 
relational responding. The purpose of the present article is to report an 
RFT-based investigation of the age-related development of deception. To 
sketch the background to this research, first, a brief description of ToM, 
including the approach to deception, will be provided. Next, an introduction 
to RFT will be given, including a relational frame account of the skill of 
deception. Finally a description of the present study will be laid out.
ToM
According to Howlin, Baron-Cohen, and Hadwin (1999), a person’s 
knowledge of informational states in the self and others develops across 
five levels from simple visual perspective-taking to understanding true 
and false beliefs. Levels 1–3 consist of simple visual perspective-taking, 
complex visual perspective-taking, and applying information based on the 
principle of seeing leads to knowing, respectively. Levels 4 and 5 of this 
model consist of the development of understanding true and false beliefs, 
respectively. In this view, the skills of perspective-taking are believed to 
be essential prerequisites for the development of an understanding of true 
and false beliefs.
In the ToM literature, deception involves understanding other minds 
because it requires a person to make someone else believe that something 
is true when it is in fact false (i.e., see Baron-Cohen, Tager-Flusberg, & 
Cohen, 2000). According to ToM, children must reach Level 5, the ability 
to represent false beliefs, before they can begin to show deception, which 
involves the deliberate construction and communication of a false belief 
to another (see Yirmiya et al., 1996). Deception, from a ToM perspective, 
has been demonstrated in normally developing children around the age 
of 6 years (Marvin, Greenberg, & Mossler, 1976).
A range of procedures have been employed by ToM researchers to 
assess deception skills in children, including traditional hide-and-seek 
games and the more complex Unexpected Transfer Task (Chandler, 
Fritz, & Hala, 1989; Wimmer, & Perner, 1983). The Unexpected Transfer 
Task involves employing dolls and props to enact a sequence of events. 
For instance, children are asked whether a boy, whose mother changed 
the location of a bar of chocolate in his absence, would know where the 
chocolate was when returning to the scene. Wimmer and Perner found that 
children aged 4 years and older responded correctly by indicating that the 
boy would not know where the chocolate was and thus would look for the 
chocolate in the place in which he had left it. In contrast, the view holds that 
younger children would not complete the task successfully because they 
could not reconcile the conflict between reality and their own knowledge of 
the truth (i.e., that the chocolate is now in the cupboard) and the boy’s false 
mental state (i.e., the belief that the chocolate is where he put it because he 
did not see it being moved; Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001).
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The false-belief scenario has been extended as a means of assessing 
behavior on tasks of deception. The scenario, as described above, unfolds 
as follows: The boy’s brother is introduced. Children are instructed that 
the boy’s brother also wants the chocolate and so he asks the boy where 
it is. If the boy (who still wrongly believes that the chocolate is in Cupboard 
X) wishes to deceive his brother and avoid him getting the chocolate, then 
he must deceive his brother by telling him the chocolate is in Cupboard X, 
although he believes the chocolate to be in Cupboard Y. Of course, the 
deception in this case is based on the boy’s false belief (that the chocolate 
is in Cupboard X), and thus it is likely that his attempts to deceive his 
brother will unintentionally lead him to identify the correct cupboard 
(Y) in which the chocolate is placed. This complex scenario, therefore, 
incorporates an understanding of both false belief and deception and is 
complicated further by the participants’ own true belief concerning the 
location of the chocolate.
One of the primary reasons for the interest in deception has arisen 
from reliable findings suggesting that children with autism present deficits 
both in understanding and orchestrating deception (Baron-Cohen, 1992; 
Baron-Cohen & Hammer, 1997; Baron-Cohen et al., 2000). An example 
of one test is the “penny hiding game,” in which the aim is not to reveal 
the hand you have hidden a penny in. Young children with autism often 
make errors in this game, which suggests they do not understand how to 
deceive very well (Baron-Cohen, 1992). 
RFT
Until relatively recently, however, behavior analysts have paid 
little or no attention to the development of complex cognitive abilities 
such as deception. With the recent advent of the functional analytic 
behavioral approach known as RFT (Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, & Roche, 
2001), however, this situation has begun to change. RFT researchers 
conceptualize deception, like many other complex cognitive abilities, 
as generalized operant behavior referred to as derived or arbitrarily 
applicable relational responding. Similar empirical predictions have been 
proposed under RFT (Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, & Roche). 
According to RFT, deception can be understood in terms of the 
relation between deictic terms used to describe one’s perspective on 
events in the environment and the physical location within the environment 
(McHugh, Barnes-Holmes, & Barnes-Holmes, 2004; McHugh, Barnes-
Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, & Stewart, 2006). The deictic relations that 
are most important in this regard are I-YOU, HERE-THERE, and NOW-THEN. 
What is unique about deictic relations is that unlike other relations, they 
do not appear to have formal or nonarbitrary counterparts. (For example, 
“same as” relations can be based on physical [or perceptual] rather than 
arbitrary similarity.) Instead, it is the relationship between the individual 
and the environment that serves as the constant variable on which deictic 
frames are based. Deictic relations are believed to emerge in part through 
a history of responding to questions such as “What am I doing here?” 
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and “What were you doing then?” Although the form of these questions 
is often identical across contexts, the physical environment is always 
different. What remain consistent are the relational properties of I versus 
YOU, HERE versus THERE, and NOW versus THEN. These relational properties 
are said to be abstracted through learning to talk about one’s perspective 
in relation to the perspective of others (Barnes-Holmes, Stewart, Dymond, 
& Roche, 2000; Dymond & Barnes, 1997; Hayes, 1984). For example, I is 
always from this perspective HERE and NOW but not from the perspective 
of another person THERE and THEN. 
From this perspective, deictic relations are critical in understanding 
deception as illustrated in the following example. Imagine that I wish to 
deceive you about the location of a book. I may tell you that “I put the 
book on the bookshelf,” whereas in fact I put the book in my briefcase. 
As a result of this false version of events, you will likely look for the book 
on the bookshelf and not in my briefcase. The RFT interpretation of these 
events is as follows (see Figure 1): (1) To deceive you, I must first be 
able to take the perspective of YOU to determine where YOU will believe 
the book to be, from the information I provide. (2) In this case, the if-then 
relation controls a transfer of information (where I believe the book to be) 
in accordance with an entailed deictic relation, (3) as well as a transfer of 
information (where you will look for the book) in accordance with a relation 
of distinction (relation c: between the actual location of the book and where 
I say the book is). In this way, approaching deception as something that 
Figure 1. Diagrammatic representation of the relations involved in deceiving another.
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involves deictic relational complexity may allow for a unique analysis of the 
underlying processes involved in deceiving another. This analysis allows 
the predictions of relational complexity to be extended to the domain of 
deception by means of harmonization with the procedures of RFT.
The aim of the present study was to investigate deception task 
performance of five different age groups in the context of tasks involving 
varying levels of relational complexity. The five age groups consisted 
of 3- to 5-, 6- to 8-, 9- to 11-, 12- to 16-, and 20- to 30–year-olds). Two 
different forms of relational complexity were systematically manipulated. 
The first was deictic complexity, which was manipulated at three levels 
(i.e., first order, second order, and control). The second was nondeictic 
complexity, which was manipulated at two levels (negative and positive). 
It was predicted that outcomes would be a function of age, with younger 
participants showing a greater distinction in performance on the nondeictic 
tasks depending on the level of relational complexity involved.
An important distinction in the current tasks can be made between 
tasks that involve increased relational complexity but no deictic relational 
complexity (NDRC) and tasks that involve increased deictic relational 
complexity (DRC). The former was manipulated with the introduction of 
negation. Negated relations are inherently more relationally complex. For 
example, to know that John is not Mary you need to know that John is 
John and Mary is Mary prior to negating the relation. DRC tasks varied on 
the basis of the introduction of the prefix “I know you know,” which involves 
the same relation taken from different deictic perspectives. It is predicted 
that outcomes will be a function of age, with younger participants showing 
a greater distinction in performance on the nondeictic tasks, depending 
on the level of relational complexity involved. These tasks involve 
manipulating negation a repertoire that should be emerging in the young 
children’s repertoires. However, very young children will predictably not 
show as much indication of differential deictic relational responding, as 
deictic responding involves taking the perspective of another. This more 
complex form of relational responding is predicted to produce a greater 
within-group distinction in the older participants. 
Method
Participants and Setting
The current study involved 40 participants, 8 from each of five 
age ranges as follows: 3–5 years (early childhood), 6–8 years (middle 
childhood), 9–11 years (late childhood), 12–15 years (adolescence), and 
18–30 years (adulthood). All adult participants were recruited through 
faculty board advertisements from within the Department of Psychology at 
the National University of Ireland, Maynooth. The children and adolescents 
who participated were volunteers recruited from several schools within 
the Dublin area. Only those for whom no identified learning difficulty was 
present were selected. The consent of parents and teachers was obtained 
prior to the participation of each child or adolescent.
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The study was conducted in a small, quiet room that contained a 
desk, a chair, and a laptop personal computer. The laptop had a 550-MHz 
processor, a 14-inch (35.6-cm) color monitor, and a standard computer 
mouse for input. All stimulus presentation and recording of responses 
were controlled with the computer, which was programmed in Microsoft 
Visual Basic 6.0.
Procedure
The same general procedure was employed with all five groups of 
participants. However, a number of minor modifications were made to 
simplify the presentation of the experimental tasks for the early and middle 
childhood groups. The details concerning the general procedure, therefore, 
for each of these two groups will be described separately below.
Late childhood, adolescent, and adult groups. Participants from the 
three oldest groups were exposed to all 60 tasks randomly presented in 
one experimental session, during which the experimenter remained outside 
the experimental room. Before the commencement of the experimental 
tasks, participants were exposed to a series of practice sessions in which 
they were familiarized with the basic computer interactions that were 
necessary to conduct the experimental tasks. For the three oldest groups 
of participants, this simply involved using the computer mouse to drag 
and drop several practice sets containing three pictures, in which one 
picture was dropped onto the source picture on screen. Each participant 
continued with the practice sets until she or he indicated readiness to 
begin the experimental tasks. 
Prior to the first experimental task, each participant had the following 
instructions read aloud to them:
Each computer screen presents three pictures and a question. The 
question will appear at the very top of the screen. There will also 
be one picture below the question and then another two pictures 
at the bottom of the screen. You will also hear the question in my 
voice presented aloud on the headphones. Your job is to look at 
the screen and to try to answer the question regarding the pictures. 
You answer the questions by simply placing the picture at the top 
of the screen on top of one of the pictures below. All you have to do 
is use the mouse to drag the picture from the top and drop it onto 
the one on the bottom which you think is correct. The computer will 
then present the next task immediately. The computer will let you 
know when the experiment is over. 
After the instructions had been read out, the sheet on which they 
appeared was placed on the table beside the participant, where it 
remained for the rest of the experimental session. At that point, each 
participant was asked whether he or she had any questions, and where 
appropriate, these queries were addressed immediately. After addressing 
all queries, the experimenter directed the participant’s attention to the 
screen and then left the room.
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After the last test trial had been completed, the following message 
appeared on the screen: “Thank you for your participation. Please report 
to the experimenter.” Once the experimenter reentered the room, the 
participant was thanked and debriefed.
Early and middle childhood groups. Three key modifications with 
regard to the running of the experiment were necessary for the youngest 
group of participants, although the types of tasks and their presentations 
were identical. First, all “drag and drop” interactions with the program 
were conducted by the experimenter. In other words, each child was 
simply required to orient toward one of the pictures on-screen, point to 
the picture, and name the picture onto which the other picture would be 
dropped. The response was then conducted by the experimenter. Second, 
five additional practice tasks were conducted with these participants to 
ensure that they were fully aware of what they were being asked to do. 
Third, these participants were exposed to five experimental sessions of 
12 tasks each (rather than one session of 60 tasks).
Protocol
The deception protocol consisted of one block of 60 questions 
comprising six types of tasks and five stimulus sets (two of each task type 
per set; see Table 1). Tasks varied along two dimensions of complexity: 
(1) deictic relational complexity (i.e., first- and second-order) and 
(2) nondeictic relational complexity (i.e., presence or absence of logical 
NOT; see Table 2). The six tasks, therefore, were denoted as follows: 
first-order positive tasks, first-order negative tasks, second-order positive 
tasks, second-order negative tasks, control positive tasks, and control 
negative tasks. 
Table 1
The Five Stimulus Sets Presented During the Experiment
Stimulus Set Object to Be Hidden Locations for Hiding Objects
Set 1 Teddy bear Toy box and refrigerator
Set 2 Loaf of bread Bread bin and cookie jar
Set 3 Pencils Pencil case and Smarties box
Set 4 Cookies Teapot and cookie jar
Set 5 Shirt Car and wardrobe
Note. Each stimulus set was constructed specifically for the deception protocol and 
contained three items that were related in a particular way. For example, Set 1 consisted of 
a teddy bear, a toy box, and a refrigerator. These items were selected because one might 
expect to find a teddy in a toy box but not in a fridge. In this way, the hypothetical locations 
of the items could be manipulated for the purposes of deception. 
First-order positive tasks involved a low level of deictic relational 
complexity and did not include a statement of logical NOT. Consider an I 
task type (in which a picture of a teddy bear was presented on the screen 
above pictures of a toy box and a refrigerator), as given in Table 2. This 
task is referred to as first-order because it involved the simple attribution 
of one person’s belief by another (e.g., “if I want you to find it, where do 
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you think I should hide it”), and it is described as positive because it did 
not involve logical NOT (i.e., “I wanted you to find it”). It was predicted 
that all participants would produce high levels of accuracy on first-order 
positive tasks.
First-order negative tasks involved the same level of complexity with 
regard to deictic complexity as first-order positive tasks; however, on the 
second dimension of complexity (i.e., positive or negative), they involved 
the additional frame of logical NOT, which in this case permitted a degree 
of deception in the task (see Table 2). A correct response to these tasks 
involves the participant reasoning as follows: “I (Experimenter) should 
hide the teddy in the refrigerator rather than in the toy box, because YOU 
will be unlikely to look in the refrigerator since one would not normally 
look for a teddy in a refrigerator.” It was predicted that first-order negative 
tasks would encourage more errors, particularly in the younger groups 
of participants, than the first-order positive tasks because of the added 
complexity (logical NOT) involved in the former but not in the latter. 
Second-order tasks involved more deictic complexity than first-order 
tasks. These tasks were also divided into positive and negative tasks. 
Table 2
Task Types Involving Stimulus Set 1
First-order positive task
If I have a teddy and I want you to find it, where should I put the teddy?
If you have a teddy and you want me to find it, where should you put the teddy?
First-order negative task
If I have a teddy and I don’t want you to find it, where should I hide the teddy?
If you have a teddy and you don’t want me to find it, where should you hide the teddy?
Second-order positive task
If I have a teddy and if I know that you know I’m trying to hide it from you, where should I 
hide the teddy? 
If you have a teddy and if you know that I know you’re trying to hide it from me, where 
should you hide the teddy? 
Second-order negative task
If I have a teddy and if I know that you don’t know I’m trying to hide it from you, where 
should I hide the teddy?
If you have a teddy and if you know that I don’t know you’re trying to hide it from me, 
where should you hide the teddy?
Control-positive task
You and I are playing a game. If I have a teddy and I want you to find it, where should I 
put the teddy? 
You and I are playing a game. If you have a teddy and you want me to find it, where 
should you put the teddy?
Control-negative task
You and I are playing a game. If I have a teddy and I don’t want you to find it, where 
should I hide the teddy?
You and I are playing a game. If you have a teddy and you don’t want me to find it, where 
should you hide the teddy?
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Consider the following second-order positive task presented in Table 2. 
In this task, participants are required to engage in a relatively high level 
of deictic complexity to understand the deception. The correct response 
in this case involves the participant making the following deductions: “If 
YOU think I am trying to deceive YOU, then YOU will think that I will place the 
teddy in the refrigerator as a place in which one would not normally expect 
to find a teddy. However, if I, as the deceiver, know that YOU will think this, 
then I will place the teddy in the toy box rather than in the refrigerator.” 
In this case, therefore, the correct response involves determining that I 
will hide the teddy in the toy box. Because second-order positive tasks 
involved a high level of deictic complexity, it was hypothesized that 
younger participants would produce more errors on them than on first-
order positive tasks.
Second-order negative tasks were similar in form to second-order 
positive tasks, except that they included logical NOT (see Table 2). In these 
tasks, the level of deictic complexity remains high and the deception is 
made more complex by the inclusion of logical not. Responding correctly 
to these tasks involves the participant making the following deductions: 
“You have the teddy and you are trying to hide it from me. If I do not know 
this, I will think that the teddy is in the toy box (where one would naturally 
expect to find a teddy). If you know that I think this, then you will likely hide 
the teddy in the unexpected location, the refrigerator.” Hence, responding 
correctly to this task would involve hiding the teddy in the refrigerator. 
Because second-order negative tasks involved both a high level of deictic 
complexity and logical NOT, it was predicted that younger participants 
would produce more errors than on second-order negative tasks.
Increasing the level of complexity between first-order and second-
order tasks rendered the instructional statement presented during the 
task longer in the latter than in the former. In the case of the younger 
participants in particular, therefore, it would be difficult to determine 
whether weaker performances were a result of increased relational 
complexity or simply of a perceived increase in task complexity due to 
the length of instruction. Furthermore, it was also possible that the young 
participants would find it more difficult to attend to tasks containing longer 
instructional statements. To control for these two possible influences, 
two additional types of task were incorporated into the protocol, namely 
a control positive task and a control negative task. These tasks were 
identical in structure to the first-order positive and negative tasks, 
respectively, except that an additional phrase was added (i.e., “you and I 
are playing a game”), so that that the instructional statement was also the 
same length as that presented during a second-order task. This particular 
phrase was selected because it matched approximately the length of 
the additional phrase used in the second-order tasks (“if I know that you 
don’t know”) but did not alter the complexity of the task in any way. Both 
positive and negative control tasks also contained I and YOU task types 
(see Table 1). It was hypothesized that participants would respond to the 
control positive and control negative tasks in much the same way as they 
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would respond on the first-order positive and first-order negative tasks, 
respectively, because the only differences between these tasks was the 
length of the instruction provided.
Results
The number of correct responses in each of the six task types 
was calculated for each of the five age categories, and these data are 
presented in Figure 2. It shows a developmental trend for accuracy across 
five of the six types of task (i.e., all except second-order positive tasks). 
Amalgamating numbers of correct responses in each age group showed 
that participants in the youngest age group (3–5 years) produced the 
least number of correct responses (M: 27.38), while participants in the 
oldest age group (18–30 years) produced the largest number of correct 
responses (M: 58.13).
Figure 2. Mean number correct across the five age groups for the five trial types: first-order 
positive (white bars); first-order negative (gray bars); second-order positive (black bars); 
second-order negative (striped bars); control positive (dotted bars); and control negative 
(diamond bars).
To determine whether age affected task performance, a 2 × 3 × 5 
mixed repeated measures ANOVA, with Valence (positive or negative) 
and Complexity (first order, second order, or control) as the within-subject 
variables and Age as the between-subject variable, was performed. The 
analysis revealed a significant main effect for Age, F (4, 35) = 17.45, p 
< .0001, and for Complexity, F (2, 70) = 17.09, p < .0001, but not for 
Valence. There was a significant interaction between Complexity and 
Age, F (2, 70) = 4.75, p < .0001, and between Complexity and Valence, F 
(2, 70) = 9.08, p < .0001, but no significant interaction between Valence 
and Age. Finally, there was also a three-way interaction between Age, 
Valence, and Complexity, F (8,70) = 2.24, p < .05.
Figure 2 indicates some common trends across age group for 
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participants’ performances on the various task types. All groups were more 
accurate on first-order than on second-order Complexity tasks. In addition, 
on the first-order tasks, greater accuracy was observed for positive than 
for negative Valence tasks, particularly among the three youngest groups 
of participants. Within the second-order tasks, greater accuracy on the 
positive tasks was recorded for both of the two youngest groups, while both 
of the two oldest groups appeared to produce more accurate performances 
on the second-order negative tasks. Similar accuracy scores emerged for 
all groups on the first-order positive and control positive tasks, as well as 
on the first-order negative and control negative tasks. These latter findings 
suggest that the apparent differences between first-order and second-order 
tasks were not merely a function of the length of the question presented 
within a task. If the latter was the case, then the control tasks would have 
differed from the first-order tasks in a manner similar to the differences 
recorded with the second-order tasks.
Age Comparison t Tests
The planned comparisons across the five age groups revealed that 
eight of the 10 comparisons were significant, particularly those involving 
comparisons of the early and middle childhood groups with the older 
participants. The statistical differences were as follows: early childhood 
versus middle childhood, t (14) = 2.15, p <.05; early childhood versus late 
childhood, t (14) = 6.12, p < .0001; early childhood versus adolescence, t 
(14) = 10.09, p < .0001; early childhood versus adulthood, t (14) = 21.30, 
p < .0001; middle childhood versus late childhood, t (14) = 3.32, p < .005; 
middle childhood versus adolescence, t (14) = 4.25, p < .005; middle 
childhood versus adulthood, t (14) = 7.362, p < .0001; and late childhood 
and adulthood, t (14) = 2.261, p < .005. Nonsignificant differences were 
recorded between late childhood and adolescence, t (14) = 0.00, p > .05, 
and between adolescence and adulthood, t (14) =3.77, p > .05. These 
findings support the developmental trend apparent in Figure 2 and suggest 
that the greatest differences in accuracy were recorded between those 
participants with the largest age differences, while smaller differences 
were recorded between those participants who were closer in age. 
DRC and NDRC Comparisons
An important distinction in the current tasks might be made between 
tasks that involve increased relational complexity but NDRC and tasks that 
involve increased DRC. The former were manipulated by the introduction 
of negation. Comparisons of the five age groups and across NDRC and 
DRC tasks (Holm’s sequential Bonferroni method being employed across 
all pair-wise comparisons to control for Type I errors) revealed that for early 
childhood, there was no significant difference between positive first order and 
positive second order, t (7) = –1.59, p > .05; positive first order and positive 
control, t (7) = .271, p > .05; negative first order and negative control, t (7) = 
.919, p > .0; positive first order and negative first order, t (7) = 1.21, p > .05; 
or positive second order and negative second order t (7) = 1.64, p > .05.
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For the middle childhood group a significant effect emerged for 
positive first order versus positive second order, t (7) = 2.43, p < .05; 
positive first order versus positive control, t (7) = 2.37, p < .0; and positive 
first order versus negative first order, t (7) = 4.25, p < .01. There was no 
significant effect for negative first order versus negative control, t (7) = 
–.63, p > .05; or positive second order versus negative second order, t 
(7) = .00; p > .05
Analysis for the late childhood group revealed a significant effect for 
positive first order versus positive second order, t (7) = 3.07, p < .05; and 
no significant difference for positive first order versus positive control, t 
(7) = –1.43, p > .05; negative first order versus negative control, t (7) = 
–.882, p > .05; positive first order versus negative first order, t (7) = 1.41, 
p > .05; or positive second order versus negative second order, t (7) = 
–0.764, p > .05.
The analysis for the adolescence group revealed a significant effect 
for positive first order versus positive second order, t (7) = 3.72, p <.05; 
and no significant effect for positive first order versus positive control, t 
(7) = 0.00, p > .05; negative first order versus negative control, t (7) = 
–1.95, p > .05; positive first order versus negative control, t (7) = 1.58, p > 
.05; or positive second order versus negative second order t (7) = –1.54; 
p > .05. Finally, the analysis for the adult group indicated no significant 
difference at the .05 level between any of the task comparisons.
In summary, only at adolescence does performance on positive and 
negative relations correspond. Furthermore, while the two youngest age 
groups of children do not seem to show as much indication of differential 
deictic relational responding (thus no decrement between first and second 
order), all the way through to adolescence there is such an indication and 
such a decrement (controlling for mere complexity), and it is pronounced 
even in adolescence.
Discussion
The results of the current study yielded significant between-group 
differences with regard to age, with the two younger groups (i.e., 3- to 
5-year-olds and 6- to 8-year-olds) producing significantly more correct 
responses than the older groups. Indeed, the findings on the deception 
protocol overall suggested that levels of accuracy increased as a function 
of age. Moreover, the level of relational complexity involved in the tasks 
was reflected with lower levels of accurate responding. All five groups of 
participants produced higher levels of accuracy on the two types of first-
order tasks (involving less deictic relational complexity) than on the two 
types of second-order tasks (involving more deictic relational complexity). 
As predicted, this finding was particularly pronounced for the two youngest 
age groups of participants. The incorporation of control tasks indicated that 
it was the higher level of complexity involved in responding to these tasks 
and not the added word length per se that accounted for the differences in 
accurate responding between the first-order and the second-order tasks. 
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The current data are consistent with previous findings from the 
relational complexity literature, in that the greater the complexity involved 
in the tasks, the higher the error rate, particularly with the youngest group 
of participants (Andrews et al., 2003). This consistency was also observed 
in the greater accuracy scores for first-order tasks relative to second-order 
ones, in that the latter clearly involve a higher degree of deictic relational 
complexity. It is interesting that there were no significant differences 
in performance on tasks that involved logical NOT versus those that 
did not. Previous perspective-taking research by McHugh et al. (2004) 
demonstrated that manipulating deictic complexity (across the relations 
of I-YOU, HERE-THERE, and NOW-THEN) produced significantly different 
levels of responding. Specifically, the more deictic complexity involved in 
tasks was directly correlated with lower accuracy levels. However, in a 
subsequent study, targeting false belief, McHugh et al (2006) compared 
tasks with and without logical NOT rather than deictic complexity per se. 
No significant differences emerged for trial type, suggesting a functional 
overlap with the results of the present study in that accuracy on deception 
and false belief tasks did not vary as a function of logical NOT (whether the 
tasks were positive or negative). 
The current work extends the findings of previous empirical analyses 
of perspective taking and false belief from an RFT perspective to the 
domain of deception in demonstrating a developmental profile (McHugh 
et al., 2004; McHugh et al., 2006). The similarities in the developmental 
trends for perspective taking, false belief, and deception suggest some 
overlap in the relational skills targeted in the relevant protocols and 
support the RFT view that repertoires of derived relational responding, 
especially responding in accordance with the deictic perspective-taking 
frames, lie at the core of these complex cognitive abilities (Barnes-Holmes 
et al., 2000; Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, & Cullinan, 2001). 
A possible criticism of the present study might be that responding to 
questions presented on the computer screen does not involve the same 
behavioral processes as purposeful deceiving or changing perspective over 
the course of social interactions with another person. This notion questions 
the construct validity of the current protocol. However, if one cannot 
respond in accordance with the basic relations involved in deception on the 
computer screen, then perhaps one is also unable to deceive someone in 
real life. In other words, if there is a difference between these two situations, 
it is likely that real-life scenarios are more complex. Specifically, to deceive 
someone requires you to understand true versus false and the effect of 
false understanding on someone’s action. If you do not have this basic 
understanding, then you cannot deceive another. 
RFT offers an analysis of perspective taking that explains this 
behavior as being based on a history of in principle empirically analyzable 
subject-environment interactions. Perspective taking, false belief, and 
deception are conceptualized by RFT as particular patterns of arbitrarily 
applicable relational responding or relational framing, which RFT sees 
as the core behavior involved in language. Multiple different relational 
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response patterns are implicated in language development, including 
patterns of Same, Different, Opposite, More Than/Less Than, and so forth 
(Hayes et al., 2001). 
According to RFT, arbitrarily applicable relational responding is 
established, in large part, by an appropriate history of exemplar training 
(Hayes & Hayes, 1989). RFT allows for the implementation and refinement 
of interventions in which these frames have not developed or are at a weak 
strength (for example, persons with diagnoses on the autistic spectrum; 
Baron-Cohen, 1992). With RFT, it would be predicted that poor performance 
on deictic relational tasks would be remediated through explicit exposure 
to multiple exemplars of training tasks employed across numerous stimulus 
sets. The procedures reported herein might facilitate the harmonization of 
tasks from the relational complexity literature with RFT and allow for the 
establishment of repertoires, where deficient, ab initio. 
One advantage of the relational frame approach is that it affords the 
possibility to establish deictic relational repertoires where they are lacking. 
This possibility may be achieved by, for instance, exposing participants to 
a series of deception tasks across multiple exemplars and then exposing 
participants to a test phase that involves a novel set of stimuli. Explicit 
training of this kind across multiple exemplars may accelerate the natural 
learning cycle and permit investigation of the conditions necessary for 
a deception repertoire to become established. Future research should 
address this issue. 
Researchers from the previous RFT studies on perspective taking 
and false belief noted the consistency between the RFT data and the 
results from more traditional theory of mind research. It is not surprising, 
therefore, that the findings of the current study are also consistent with 
the results of the mainstream literature on the development of deception. 
For example, Wimmer and Perner (1983) reported a sharp developmental 
increase in children’s ability to deceive between the ages of four and six 
years, which is largely consistent with the present findings. This overlap 
with both previous RFT studies and existing mainstream findings suggests 
that there may be some utility in building conceptual bridges to the RFT 
view of deception and related skills as complex repertoires of derived 
relational responding. 
In concert with previous studies, the current findings demonstrate that 
RFT may facilitate the analysis of psychological events that previously 
did not appear particularly amenable to a behavior analytic investigation. 
Furthermore, the current work suggests that deception may be usefully 
defined in terms of functionally distinct relational operants, and the 
systematic analysis of these operants might well inform a behavioral 
understanding of what it means to deceive another. This development, 
therefore, could also have important implications for the establishment 
of deception and complex perspective-taking skills in the context of 
programs of remediation for persons without these skills. The broad 
and diverse nature of the applicability of this work suggests that future 
research in this area is a worthwhile endeavor.
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